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Abstract 
Active safety systems have the potential to reduce the risk to pedestrians by warning the driver and/or taking 
evasive action to reduce the effects of or avoid a collision. However, current systems are limited in the range of 
scenarios they can address using primary control interventions, and this arguably places more emphasis in some 
situations on warning the driver so that they can take appropriate action in response to pedestrian hazards. In a 
counterbalanced experimental design, we varied urgency (‘when’) based on the time-to-collision (TTC) at which 
the warning was presented (with associated false-positive alarms, but no false negatives, or ‘misses’), and modality 
(‘how’) by presenting warnings using audio-only and audio combined with visual alerts presented on a HUD. 
Results from 24 experienced drivers, who negotiated an urban scenario during twelve 6.0-minute drives in a 
medium-fidelity driving simulator, showed that all warnings were generally rated ‘positively’ (using recognised 
subjective ‘acceptance’ scales), although acceptance was lower when warnings were delivered at the shortest (2.0s) 
TTC. In addition, drivers indicated higher confidence in combined audio and visual warnings in all situations. 
Performance (based on safety margins associated with critical events) varied significantly between warning onset 
times, with drivers first fixating their gaze on the hazard, taking their foot off the accelerator, applying their foot 
on the brake, and ultimately bringing the car to a stop further from the pedestrian when warnings were presented 
at the longest (5.0s) TTC. In addition, drivers applied the brake further from the pedestrian when combined audio 
and HUD warnings were provided (compared to audio-only), but only at 5.0s TTC. Overall, the study indicates a 
greater margin of safety associated with the provision of earlier warnings, with no apparent detriment to 
acceptance, despite relatively high false alarm rates at longer TTCs. Also, that drivers feel more confident with a 
warning system present, especially when it incorporates auditory and visual elements, even though the visual cue 
does not necessarily improve hazard localisation or driving performance beyond the advantages offered by 
auditory alerts alone. Findings are discussed in the context of the design, evaluation and acceptance of active safety 
systems. 
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1. Introduction 
Accidents involving vulnerable road users (VRUs) remain a major issue for road safety, accounting for almost 
40% of road fatalities in Europe, and almost 50% worldwide [1]. Pedestrians are one of the most vulnerable road 
user groups, both in terms of the likelihood of being involved in a near-miss or collision, and the potential 
ramifications should an incident occur. For example, in the US, pedestrians represent 11-13% of those killed in 
collisions and are 1.5 times more at risk than vehicle passengers to be fatally injured [2, 3]. Analysis of accident 
data shows that a high percentage of pedestrian-related incidents occur in urban areas [4], where cars drive at 
relatively low speeds and the density of pedestrians is likely to be high, with many of these accidents attributed to 
unexpected or inappropriate pedestrian behaviour, such as crossing the road at the incorrect place or time. For 
example, in 2013 over 80% of UK pedestrian road-related fatalities occurred outside of demarcated pedestrian 
crossings [5]. More recent in-depth accident analysis of European crash databases (including CARE, IGLAD and 
GIDAS), conducted as part of the PROSPECT project [6], revealed that the most common accident scenario in 
Europe is situations in which the pedestrian crosses a straight road from the nearside (or offside) with no 
obstructions. This accounts for the highest proportion of killed or seriously injured pedestrians (KSI) and all 
pedestrian injuries, and is therefore the designated scenario proposed by the EuroNCAP testing protocol for AEB 
pedestrian safety systems [7]. 
The past decade has seen significant progress in active pedestrian safety in passenger cars, in particular due to 
advances in video and radar technology. This has resulted in the market introduction of first-generation active 
pedestrian safety systems that can identify at-risk pedestrians and perform autonomous emergency braking (AEB-
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PED) in critical traffic situations. In addition, other primary control interventions, such as steering (and braking 
jerks or steering wheel vibrations to provide haptic feedback to the driver [8]), are increasingly being integrated 
within vehicles. Such systems, collectively termed Pedestrian and Cyclist Detection Systems with Emergency 
Braking (PCDS+EBR), have the potential to mitigate the risk to VRUs by warning drivers of an impending 
collision and/or taking evasive action autonomously by braking, steering or both, if a collision becomes imminent 
or if the driver fails to respond. Moreover, evidence suggest that PCDS+EBR systems have the greatest potential 
(based on current active safety systems) to improve the safety of VRUs, with data indicating a reduction of 7.5% 
on all road fatalities and 5.8% on all road injuries, representing an estimated 2,100 fatalities and over 62,900 
injuries saved per year in Europe based on accident trends [9]. 
However, such systems are non-trivial, requiring the optimisation and integration of situation analysis and 
collision risk estimation, information and warning concepts, and vehicle control strategies [8]. Moreover, the 
effectiveness of intervention strategies will vary considerably depending on use-case [8], with first generation 
systems currently on the market addressing only a limited scope of scenarios [6]. For example, if a driver is turning 
across the path of a pedestrian or cyclist, and a collision is predicted, the available net braking distance is 
effectively only 1.57m (assuming a typical cornering speed of approximately 20km/h and a deceleration of 9.81 
m/s2), and the maximum achievable vehicle displacement from the original driving path will thus be reduced to 
less than 0.6m [8]. Moreover, in this situation, braking and evasive steering can only occur when the vehicle has 
started to drive in the bend. This arguably places a greater emphasis in this situation on warning the driver so that 
they can manually instigate appropriate evasive action.  
Indeed, as a rule, all systems will attempt to warn the driver before taking any action. Moreover, where possible, 
warnings will be provided with increasing urgency depending upon the perceived risk level. For example, the 
PROSPECT system (as realised by Continental [8]), provides two types of VRU collision warning, based on risk 
level [8]. The first (classified as an ‘early warning’) is an informative warning to the driver about a potentially 
dangerous traffic situation involving a VRU, based on a trajectory prediction of VRU and the vehicle but without 
considering the velocities of both participants, and is therefore necessarily ambiguous. The second type of warning 
is an imminent acoustic and visual warning, which takes into consideration not only the geometric properties of 
the predicted trajectories but also the time of potential collision (measured as time-to-collision, TTC, in this case 
is 1.8 seconds). It is therefore velocity-dependent and assumes that both VRU and the ego vehicle preserve their 
speeds until the collision occurs. Similarly, the Daimler system provides three warnings (visual and/or auditory), 
at 4.0 seconds TTC (‘early warning’), 2.6 seconds TTC (‘warning’), and 1.6 seconds TTC (‘urgent warning’), 
before taking action (i.e. braking at 1.1 seconds TTC). 
In addition, ongoing advances in situation analysis, collision risk estimation and intent prediction and 
modelling (based on improvements in both detection hardware and software algorithms) mean that active safety 
systems are therefore effectively moving from ‘collision mitigation’ (with the aim of reducing vehicle 
speed/kinetic energy to make the impact more survivable) to ‘collision avoidance’ (aiming to avoid collisions 
completely). As a consequence, the number of false alarms and/or activations is also expected to increase, in part 
due to the highly dynamic behaviour of pedestrians, who may change their walking direction and speed, or abruptly 
start or stop moving at a moment’s notice. For example, a pedestrian may approach the roadside, apparently 
intending to cross, but then stop at the kerb. This could result in a false declaration if the system has already 
identified the pedestrian as a potential hazard (based on current speeds and trajectories) and highlighted their 
presence to the driver. Indeed, figures show that first-generation pedestrian safety systems (still on the market) 
miss approximately 20-30% of all pedestrians (‘false negative’), and issue approximately one false alarm (‘false 
positive’), for every ten presented [10]. While future generations will likely reduce the incidence of false alarms 
and/or activations, false alarms remain unavoidable in any ‘predictive’ technology. Moreover, the frequency and 
occurrence of false alarms and activations will inevitably influence drivers’ attitudes towards the system, 
potentially encouraging them to neglect it, find creative ways to bypass it, or if possible deactivate it completely 
[11]. 
The success of such technology is therefore contingent not only on its ability to accurately detect pedestrians, 
make a precise estimation of their current and future positions with respect to the moving vehicle, and provide 
timely warnings and/or primary control interventions, but also on driver’s attitudes towards it (i.e. their 
‘acceptance’). On the face of it, these are conflicting goals: by warning drivers sooner, they may have more time 
and space to respond to warnings, but earlier warnings will be offered at the expense of accuracy, due to both 
limitations in technologies (range and capability of sensors, accuracy of detection algorithms etc.), as well as 
idiosyncrasies in the behaviour of pedestrians, and a high number of false declarations will likely detriment 
acceptance. As such, there is still considerable interest in investigating when and how to present warnings to 
drivers, in particular to minimise false positive or unnecessary reactions, and improve driver acceptance. 
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Acceptance and Urgency  
One of the biggest ‘human’ challenges in the design of automated vehicle systems is how to keep the driver 
appraised of the driving situation (i.e. ‘in the loop’) [12]. Essential to this is the provision of appropriate feedback 
to the driver about what the system has done, is doing, or is about to do. Norman [13] warned that “proper feedback 
can make the difference between a pleasurable and successful system and one that frustrates and confuses”. In an 
automotive context, feedback can also be the difference between a safe and an unsafe system, and is particularly 
important considering the time-criticality of much of the information presented by automated systems [14]. It is 
also therefore particularly relevant to ensuring an appropriate level of driver acceptance.  
The ‘acceptance’ of in-vehicle driver support systems has been defined as, “the degree to which an individual 
incorporates the system in his/her driving, or if the system is not available, intends to use it” [15]. The determinants 
of acceptance are thus complex and derive from various factors, including how individuals use the technology, 
their understanding of its limits and the context in which it is implemented. Acceptance can also be affected by 
factors such as the level of trust, confidence, intrusion, or annoyance that users associate with the technology. A 
common ground in acceptance research is the notion that human behaviour is not primarily determined by objective 
factors, but by subjective perceptions [16]. This means that acceptance is based on individual attitudes, 
expectations and experience, obtained during actual use, as well as their subjective evaluation of expected benefits  
[17]. In fact, it has been shown that the degree of technological innovation has a lesser effect on the acceptance 
and use of new technological systems than does the amount of personal importance for users [18]. Moreover, for 
an in-vehicle hazard warning system, in particular, acceptance is considered to be closely related to the driver’s 
perception of risk – not necessarily the actual risk of collision [19]. Drivers are therefore more likely to accept 
alerts presented in situations that they perceive to be ‘alarming’ (for example, they have already identified an 
encroaching pedestrian as a potential threat), even if they would have been able to avoid the incident without the 
warning [20]. Regardless of the technical capabilities of PCDS, the successful future implementation and 
integration of such technology will thus depend largely on the degree to which drivers ‘accept’ the technology, 
and are willing to place their trust in the system above their own judgement [21].  
For a pedestrian alert system, understanding when to present alarms is therefore an important consideration – 
if alarms are presented too early, accuracy may be compromised or the driver may be unaware of the potential 
risk, thereby negatively impacting acceptance. Moreover, earlier PCDS alerts may be interpreted by the driver as 
false positive alarms (i.e. the system alerts but no threat is visually detected or acted on), and may consequently 
degrade drivers’ attentiveness to future alarms [22]. On the other hand, alarms that are presented at short TTCs 
(i.e. ‘too late’) may be of limited practical use (i.e. the driver may have insufficient time to respond), can startle 
drivers, and may detriment their reaction and performance during the braking process [23]; late alarms may also 
annoy drivers, particularly if they are already aware of the hazard and have initiated their own evasive or corrective 
manoeuvre.  
Nevertheless, active safety systems must still accurately detect genuine situations. The concern is that by 
maximising detection rates, drivers are likely to be flooded with false-alarm warnings, with the inevitable 
consequence that they will miss or ignore genuine alerts in future safety-critical situations (i.e. the system ‘cries 
wolf’) [24]. In contrast, systems designed to minimise false declarations may miss genuine safety-critical 
situations, and may provide insufficient exposure to allow drivers to calibrate their trust in system [25]. Moreover, 
in the absence of false alarms, genuine alerts may be so rare as to be utterly unfamiliar and consequently drivers’ 
reactions will be unpredictable (i.e. efficient recall of how to react depends on the frequency of use [26]). 
 
Feedback and Modality 
A further consideration is how to present warnings to drivers. Visual feedback is typically presented to the 
driver using either of two methods: traditional displays or ambient displays. Traditional displays are defined as 
screens in the instrument cluster, centre console or dashboard and usually require foveal vision to attend to the 
presented information. Traditional visual displays usually have associated issues of distraction as they draw the 
driver’s attention away from the road scene – the larger the eccentricity of display location from forward view, the 
longer the eyes-off road time. In contrast, ambient displays aim to utilise peripheral vision by displaying feedback 
(e.g. lighting effects) in the A-pillars, doors, dashboard, steering wheel, and interior and exterior mirrors (see for 
examples: [8, 27, 28]). Ambient displays are much more limited in the bandwidth of information content compared 
with traditional displays, but offer a benefit in that they overcome some of the issues of distraction, requiring only 
peripheral attention. 
In addition, visual information can be presented ‘externally’ to the vehicle, via a Head-Up Display (HUD). 
HUD technology allows visual information to be presented using a transparent display located in the driver’s 
normal field of view. Consequently, feedback appears to exist ‘in the world’ rather than inside the vehicle. By 
presenting information directly within the forward-facing line of sight (i.e. on or ‘through’ the windscreen), drivers 
can access that information without lowering or diverting their gaze away from the road scene, thus avoiding the 
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apparent gaps in visual attention (‘eyes-off-road’) associated with using more traditional ‘head-down’ 
presentations. Moreover, drivers are not required to constantly re-accommodate their focal length between the 
distant road scene and nearby in-vehicle displays – a particularly important advantage for older drivers who 
experience problems with accommodating their vision to near objects [29]. Additionally, information presented 
via a HUD can be spatially linked to and augment the information in the real world to which it relates (‘conformal’) 
[30]. In the context of a warning system, conformal visual feedback (using a HUD) has been shown to help drivers 
localize threats earlier [31, 32]. Additionally, using a HUD can command attention more strongly during the 
decision-making phase, and can help mitigate other functional weaknesses (such as poorly designed controls or a 
suboptimal field of view of the road) that may exist between the driver and human-machine interface (HMI) [33, 
34, 35].  
In contrast, auditory alerts that can be heard by the driver can enhance the recognition of warnings, afford better 
semantic association, and improve drivers’ responses, but are typically unable to visually guide attention towards 
the threat [36]. However, combining auditory warnings with visual information to provide ‘multimodal’ feedback 
can reduce human reaction times [37, 38], and can be particularly effective for reorienting spatial attention [39]. 
Consequently, several novel HMI concepts to inform or warn the driver have been proposed (see examples in [8]); 
these tend to incorporate both acoustic warnings and visual elements, although, it has also been suggested that in 
some cases it may be more appropriate to provide unimodal feedback (for example, auditory only) assuming the 
information is understandable and able to capture attention in the chosen modality. 
 
Overview and Aim of Study 
Aiming to take all of these factors into consideration, the study explored the effect of the urgency and modality 
of alert warnings associated with potential pedestrian hazards detected by an active safety system. To achieve this, 
urgency was varied based on the TTC at which the warning was presented (calculated using the existing speeds 
and trajectories of car and pedestrian). Moreover, a linear relationship between TTC and false alarm rate was 
applied, with a higher proportion of false alarms associated with warnings delivered at longer TTCs. This approach 
is based on previous literature indicating that the probability of making a correct judgement of whether a pedestrian 
will cross or not in this scenario reduces at an approximate linear rate with increasing TTC [40]. The intention in 
taking this approach was primarily to reflect the higher false alarm rates based on the provision of earlier warnings, 
i.e. the system appears less ‘reliable’ at longer TTCs – as would be expected with such technology, and is not 
intended as a validation of this assumption.  
For each level of urgency, either no warning, an audio alert, or an audio alert combined with a visual warning 
projected via a HUD were explored (to investigate modality). Driver acceptance was subsequently determined 
using subjective ratings of trust, confidence, annoyance, desirability, predictability, reliance and risk (based on 
existing acceptance/usability assessment protocols [41]). In addition, objective performance was calculated based 
on safety margins associated with critical primary control events and drivers’ visual behaviour (i.e. the 
TTC/headway from the pedestrian at which drivers first located and fixated their gaze on the pedestrian hazard, 
and the TTC/headway at which they took their foot off the accelerator, applied the brake, and ultimately brought 
the car to a stop).  
 
2. Method 
Twenty-four drivers took part in the study: 15 male, 9 female, with ages ranging from 19 to 55 years, 
representative of an active UK driving population. All participants were required to have at least 2 years of driving 
experience (mean: 10.7 years). Participants were self-selecting volunteers who responded to advertisements placed 
around the University of Nottingham campus and were reimbursed with £15 (GBP) of shopping vouchers as 
compensation for their time. All participants provided written informed consent. 
The study took place in a medium-fidelity, fixed-based driving simulator at the University of Nottingham 
(Figure 1). The simulator comprises an Audi TT car located within a curved screen, affording 270 degrees forward 
and side image of the driving scene via three overhead HD projectors, together with rear and side mirror displays. 
A Thrustmaster 500RS force feedback steering wheel and pedal set are integrated with the existing Audi steering 
wheel and pedals, and the dashboard is created using a bespoke Java application and presented on a 7-inch LCD 
screen, which replaces the original instrument cluster. 
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Figure 1: Driving simulator showing urban high-street scenario and pedestrian crossing road ahead, 
with visual alert icon that was presented on the HUD (inset). 
The driving scenario was created using STISIM Drive (version 3) to replicate a straight, single-carriageway 
road traversing through a built-up urban environment, absent of demarcated pedestrian crossings. Pavements 
(‘side-walks’) were populated with approximately 5-10 pedestrians every fifty feet, who appeared in a random 
distribution, and walked forward and backward in parallel with the road, or stood facing the roadway but not 
moving. These pedestrians were included in the scenario to present a realistic, ‘visually-cluttered’ urban backdrop 
and to ensure that identifying the ‘hazard’ (i.e. the rogue pedestrian/s who walked towards the roadway) was non-
trivial.  
In addition to the ‘background’ pedestrians, a further five pedestrians were placed at random distances into the 
scenario, and approached the roadside as if intending to cross the road. Each of the five ‘hazard’ pedestrians were 
initially standing motionless approximately one metre from the roadway (corresponding with the centre of the 
‘sidewalk’) and facing the road. As such, they were ‘always’ visible to the driver (i.e. they did not move into view 
from behind an obstruction as part of the crossing manoeuvre, or suddenly materialise as the driver approached). 
They walked at a steady pace to ensure that they would reach the centre of the roadway at the same time as the car 
(assuming they continued to do so). To achieve this, the total walking distance did not vary between conditions. 
Instead, walking speed was varied (from .5 to 3mph, i.e. slightly slower than a brisk walk, typically 4mph) to 
ensure that vehicle and pedestrian trajectory would intersect (assuming neither party deviated from their current 
trajectory or speed). 
Depending on the scenario (see Table 1), a proportion of the ‘hazard’ pedestrians then continued to cross the 
road (representing the most common pedestrian accident use-case [6]), while the remainder stopped at the roadside. 
All five of these pedestrians were identified by the PCDS system, thereby giving rise to ‘false positive alarms’ in 
the latter situation (i.e. the system accurately detected the presence of a pedestrian but falsely predicted their 
intention to enter the roadway). Participants in the study were instructed to drive along the road and maintain a 
constant speed of 25mph (40kph). No specific instructions were provided to drivers regarding how they should 
respond to warnings, other than to behave ‘naturally’. They were not specifically told that some pedestrians might 
attempt to cross the roadway. 
Warnings were presented at four different levels of urgency, as defined by the TTC, with the number of 
accurately detected pedestrians (i.e. those who continued to cross the road) decreasing with increasing TTC, thus 
simulating an increasing false alarm rate. This approach is predicated on the fact that the probability of making a 
correct judgement of whether a pedestrian will cross or not (as they approach the roadside) reduces at an 
approximately linear rate with increasing TTC [40]. The TTCs (and associated false alarm rates) were thus selected 
to conform approximately with the performance of current state-of-the-art [8]. TTCs therefore ranged from 5.0-
seconds (with a false alarm rate of 80%, i.e. 4 out of 5 pedestrians approached, but ultimately did not cross the 
road) to 2.0-seconds (with a false alarm rate of 20% or 1 in 5).  
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Warnings were presented within the vehicle as a static visual alert icon and/auditory icon presented at 75dB 
(based on design guidelines [42]). A generic high-contrast visual alert icon was selected to aid ease of recognition 
and saliency to visual attention (Figure 1). The icon was presented for a period of up to 4.0-seconds, based on 
design recommendations [43]. Visual warnings were provided using a Pioneer laser-scanning head-up display 
(HUD). In addition, both visual and auditory warnings were spatially congruent (i.e. presented to correspond with 
the side of the road from which the pedestrian approached), with the aim of directing and localising the driver’s 
gaze to the target pedestrian.  
In addition to completing the drive with auditory and auditory/visual warnings, participants also repeated it for 
each false alarm rate with no warnings. Thus, participants completed 12 drives (Table 1). During ‘No Warning’ 
scenarios, the urgency levels indicate the equivalent distance at which a warning (had it been presented) would 
have generated a false alarm rate in line with our study design, and are used for comparative analysis between the 
three conditions. Conditions were counterbalanced, but participants completed all conditions for each warning 
type (and ‘no warnings’) together. 
 
Table 1: Twelve scenarios completed by all participants, showing TTCs and false alarm rates (i.e. 
number of pedestrians who did not step into the road but were nevertheless highlighted by the PCDS).  
Urgency 
Level 
TTC 
(when warning 
presented) 
Audio Only 
(4 scenarios) 
Combined 
(Audio+HUD) 
(4 scenarios) 
No 
Warning 
(4 scenarios) 
L1 2.0-sec 20% (1 in 5) 20% (1 in 5) 20% (1 in 5) 
L2 3.0-sec 40% (2 in 5) 40% (2 in 5) 40% (2 in 5) 
L3 4.0-sec 60% (3 in 5) 60% (3 in 5) 60% (3 in 5) 
L4 5.0-sec 80% (4 in 5) 80% (4 in 5) 80% (4 in 5) 
 
Timeline of Events 
During each scenario, participants drove for approximately 45 seconds before encountering any hazards. 
Thereafter, they were presented with the first deviant pedestrian (who walked towards the roadside as if intending 
to cross) randomly within the next 300m, approximately (i.e. 1000ft). No events occurred within the subsequent 
300m, to ensure that participants were not presented with back-to-back hazards. Participants then experienced the 
second pedestrian crossing event in the following 300m, and so on. This effectively resulted in the driver 
experiencing about 30-45 seconds of uninterrupted driving, followed by the next 30-45 seconds in which an event 
occurred. This pattern was repeated five times, but because of the random variability within each time window, it 
was not possible to predict events.  
After each pedestrian event (with associated warning intervention, where appropriate), participants resumed 
driving only after they felt sure that it was safe to continue (i.e. when they could confirm that the pedestrian had 
either stopped at the roadside, or had finished crossing the road). Each drive therefore lasted approximately 6-8 
minutes. Overall, the study took approximately 1½ hours for each participant. 
 
Measures 
Acceptance was determined using subjective measures, i.e. by asking participants to rate their attitudes towards 
the PCDS using recognised Likert scales (where 0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = ‘completely’), immediately following 
each of the twelve drives (with each drive corresponding to a specific warning type and time, i.e. TTC). Scales 
were taken from existing acceptance/usability assessment protocols [41], with ratings captured by inviting 
responses to seven questions exploring the constructs of trust, confidence, annoyance, desirability, predictability, 
reliance and risk (which collectively were interpreted as ‘acceptance’): 
1. Overall, how much do you trust the system? (Trust) 
2. How confident are you that the system will be able to cope with all situations in the future? (Confidence) 
3. How annoying was the system? (Annoyance) 
4. How likely would you be to use the system if it was available in your own car? (Desirability) 
5. To what extent can the system's behaviour be predicted from moment to moment? (Predictability) 
6. To what extent can you count on the system to do its job? (Reliance) 
7. To what extent will the system's actions have a harmful or injurious outcome? (Risk) 
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Performance was determined based on data captured by the simulator software and visual behaviour from 
SensoMotoric Instruments Natural Gaze eye-tracking glasses, which were worn by participants throughout the 
study. A range of objective performance measures were subsequently defined, based on the headway/TTC at which 
critical events occurred (effectively, surrogate safety margins) (Table 2). These were determined by synchronising 
the eye-tracking data with the performance data captured from the driving simulator (for gaze-related measures), 
or directly from the simulator data for primary control actions (foot off accelerator, foot on brake) and vehicle 
behaviour (car stopped). In addition, reaction times and stopping distances were captured (using a similar 
approach), and these have been reported in Large et al. [44] and Merenda et al. [21]; the reader is advised to refer 
to these papers for further information on these measures.  
 
Table 2: Subjective acceptance and objective performance measures analysed 
 
Subjective Ratings 
(‘Acceptance’) 
Objective Performance Measures 
(‘Surrogate Safety Margins’) 
 Trust 
Confidence 
Annoyance 
Desirability 
Predictability 
Reliance 
Risk 
TTC(s)/Headway(m) @ gaze on PED 
TTC(s)/Headway(m) @ foot off accelerator 
TTC(s)/Headway(m) @ foot on brake 
Headway(m) @ car stopped 
 
 
 
3. Results and Analysis 
 
Data Analysis 
To identify main and interaction effects of Urgency (measured by TTC = {2, 3, 4, 5} seconds) and Modality 
of warning (HMI = {no, Audio, Audio+HUD}) on driving performance and driver acceptance, we performed two-
way, repeated-measures ANOVAs. Prior to this, data were tested for normality using a Shapiro-Wilk normality 
test. For those data that were not normally distributed, ANOVAs were performed on log-transformed values, which 
were subsequently back-transformed to provide summary statistics (e.g. means and standard error of means) in 
their original units for reporting. In situations where significant effects were revealed, we conducted post-hoc 
contrast tests for planned comparisons among experimental conditions to investigate any interaction effects, 
applying Tukey’s adjustment to account for multiple comparisons. All data analysis was conducted using the 
statistical software program R (version 3.2.2), and the ‘lme4’ package for the mixed effects ANOVA, considering 
Urgency and Modality of warning as fixed effect factors, and Participant as a random effect factor. 
 
Subjective Ratings 
Descriptive statistics and main effects/interactions for subjective ratings are shown in Table 3 and Table 4. In 
addition, ratings are shown as box plots with 95% confidence intervals (Figure 2). There were significant main 
effects of Urgency evident for Trust (p<.01), Confidence (p < .01), Desirability (p < .05), Predictability (p < .001), 
Reliance (p < .01) and Risk (p < .05). Post-hoc tests indicated differences in perceived Trust, Confidence, 
Desirability (at p < .10), Predictability and Reliance between L1 and {L2, L3} and between L1 and L3 for Risk. 
In addition, there were significant differences between L1 and L4 for Predictability and Risk. Although overall, 
ratings were statistically ‘worse’ at L1 (lower for positive terms and higher for negative terms), all subjective 
ratings were generally positive in all situations (above 6 for positive terms, and below 5 for negative terms) (Figure 
2). Even so, there were also significant effects of Modality for Confidence, with post-hoc tests showing that 
differences existed between audio-only (W1) and audio+HUD warnings (W2), across all levels of Urgency, with 
higher ratings for combined warnings. 
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Figure 2: Drivers’ subjective ratings by urgency and modality, where 0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = 
‘completely’, with 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 3: Drivers’ acceptance, reported by subjective ratings, showing means (standard error of the means, corrected for within-subject variability) in each 
experimental condition 
 
Modality 
(HMI) 
Urgency Trust Confidence Annoyance Desirability Predictability Reliance Risk 
Audio L1 5.7 (0.42) 5.6 (0.42) 4.5 (0.43) 5.1 (0.47) 6.0 (0.39) 6.4 (0.38) 5.4 (0.47) 
Audio+HUD L1 6.6 (0.42) 6.3 (0.42) 4.7 (0.43) 5.8 (0.48) 6.1 (0.39) 6.5 (0.38) 5.1 (0.47) 
Audio L2 6.6 (0.42) 6.4 (0.43) 4.9 (0.43) 5.8 (0.48) 6.7 (0.39) 7.2 (0.38) 5.3 (0.47) 
Audio+HUD L2 7.1 (0.42) 6.9 (0.42) 4.5 (0.43) 6.0 (0.48) 6.8 (0.39) 7.5 (0.38) 4.6 (0.47) 
Audio L3 7.0 (0.42) 6.6 (0.42) 4.5 (0.43) 5.8 (0.47) 6.6 (0.39) 7.3 (0.38) 4.6 (0.47) 
Audio+HUD L3 6.9 (0.42) 6.9 (0.42) 4.5 (0.43) 5.9 (0.47) 7.2 (0.39) 7.4 (0.38) 4.6 (0.47) 
Audio L4 6.4 (0.42) 6.3 (0.42) 4.5 (0.43) 5.8 (0.48) 6.6 (0.39) 6.8 (0.38) 4.7 (0.47) 
Audio+HUD L4 6.7 (0.42) 6.5 (0.42) 5.0 (0.43) 5.8 (0.48) 6.7 (0.39) 7.2 (0.38) 4.7 (0.47) 
 
 
Table 4: Main and interaction effects of the urgency and modality of PCDS on driver subjective ratings (*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001) 
 
Effect Trust Confidence Annoyance Desirability Predictability Reliance Risk 
Urgency F(3, 137.1)=5.111** F(3, 69.0) = 4.148** F(3, 67.9) = 0.660 F(3, 137.1) = 2.843* F(3, 68.1)= 6.021*** F(3, 68.8) = 5.534** F(3, 67.8) = 3.623* 
Modality F(1, 22.7) = 2.586 F(1, 23.0) = 4.590* F(1, 22.9) = 0.082 F(1, 23.0) = 1.036 F(1, 22.9) = 0.471 F(1, 22.9) = 0.932 F(1, 21.9) = 1.069 
Urgency*Modality F(3, 137.1) = 1.868 F(3, 69.0) = 0.535 F(3, 68.6) = 1.703 F(3, 137.1) = 1.308 F(3, 68.5) = 1.115 F(3, 68.8) = 0.389 F(3, 69.2) = 0.961 
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Driving Performance (Headway and TTC) 
Descriptive statistics for driving performance measures with main effects and significant interactions are shown 
in Table 5 and Table 6, respectively. It is worth highlighting that due to the nature of the driving environment (i.e. 
a single lane carriageway), steering interventions were not practically possible, and therefore drivers reacted to the 
pedestrian threats by braking or otherwise reducing the speed of their vehicle. 
For TTC @ Gaze on Pedestrian, there was a main effect of Urgency (F(3,44.6) = 89.94, p < .001). Post-hoc 
tests show significant differences between all levels of Urgency (all p < 0.001), with TTC @ Gaze on Pedestrian 
increasing as TTC increased. There were no significant main effects for Modality (F(2, 36.9) = 0.50, p = 0.608), 
and no significant interaction between Urgency and Modality (F(6, 82.3) = 1.73, p = 0.125). 
 
 
Table 5: Driving performance measures, reported by surrogate safety metrics – means (standard error 
of the means, corrected for within-subject variability) in each experimental condition. 
Modality 
(HMI) 
Urgency 
 
TTC (s) 
@ Gaze on 
Pedestrian 
TTC (s) 
@ Foot off  
Accelerator 
TTC (s) 
@ Foot on 
Brake 
Headway (m) 
@ Car Stopped 
None L1 1.59 (0.12) 1.42 (0.02) 1.05 (0.04) 18.44 (1.56) 
Audio L1 1.43 (0.11) 1.46 (0.02) 1.11 (0.04) 20.49 (1.67) 
Audio+HUD L1 1.39 (0.09) 1.47 (0.02) 1.12 (0.04) 21.03 (1.71) 
None L2 2.31 (0.14) 2.26 (0.02) 1.56 (0.05) 37.41 (3.08) 
Audio L2 2.44 (0.14) 2.37 (0.03) 1.73 (0.05) 44.39 (3.61) 
Audio+HUD L2 2.36 (0.13) 2.42 (0.03) 1.71 (0.05) 43.65 (3.55) 
None L3 2.84 (0.17) 3.05 (0.03) 1.87 (0.06) 41.57 (3.47) 
Audio L3 3.23 (0.19) 3.28 (0.03) 2.22 (0.07) 57.48 (4.68) 
Audio+HUD L3 3.07 (0.16) 3.33 (0.04) 2.22 (0.07) 54.10 (4.40) 
None L4 3.12 (0.18) 3.42 (0.04) 2.28 (0.07) 42.50 (3.50) 
Audio L4 3.44 (0.19) 4.23 (0.05) 2.85 (0.09) 64.69 (5.41) 
Audio+HUD L4 3.74 (0.20) 4.33 (0.05) 3.14 (0.10) 64.20 (5.29) 
 
 
Table 6: Main and interaction effects of the urgency and modality of PCDS on surrogate safety metrics 
(#p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001). 
Effect 
TTC (s) 
@ Gaze on Ped. 
TTC (s) 
@ Foot off Acc. 
TTC (s) 
@ Foot on Brake 
Headway (m) 
@ Car Stopped 
Urgency F(3, 44.6) = 89.94*** F(3, 67.4) = 5037.10*** F(3, 67.6) = 427.09*** F(3, 45.8)=117.97*** 
Modality F(2, 36.9) = 0.50 F(2, 44.1) = 103.84*** F(2, 45.8) = 41.73*** F(2, 44.1) = 15.12*** 
Urgency*Modality F(6, 82.3) = 1.73 F(6, 132.8) = 33.03*** F(6, 135.8) = 5.79*** F(6, 106.4) = 2.00# 
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For TTC @ Foot off Accelerator, there were main effects for Urgency (F(3, 67.4) = 5037.10, p < .001) and 
Modality (F(2, 44.1) = 103.84, p < .001), and an interaction between Urgency and Modality (F(6,132.8) = 33.03, 
p < .001). Post-hoc tests (Table 7) show significant differences between all levels of Urgency for all warning types, 
indicating that drivers took their foot off the accelerator further from the pedestrian when warnings were provided 
at longer TTCs. In addition, there were significant differences between warning types and Urgency showing that 
when warnings were provided at the longest TTC, drivers’ initial response (i.e. taking their foot off the accelerator) 
occurred further from the pedestrian than when no warning was provided. Moreover, differences between having 
a warning and not having a warning became more pronounced as TTC increased (Figure 3). 
 
 
Table 7: Significant post-hoc tests for TTC @ Foot off Accelerator between warning types 
(W0=None, W1=Audio, W2=Audio+HUD) 
Contrast Urgency  Statistics 
w0 - w2 L1 t(168.9) = -2.55, p = 0.031 
w0 - w1 L2 t(163.6) = -3.63, p = 0.001 
w0 - w2 L2 t(163.6) = -5.34, p < 0.001 
w0 - w1 L3 t(166.2) = -5.50, p < 0.001 
w0 - w2 L3 t(166.2) = -6.77, p < 0.001 
w0 - w1 L4 t(165.1) = -15.92, p < 0.001 
w0 - w2 L4 t(166.9) = -17.78, p < 0.001 
 
 
 
Figure 3: TTC @ Foot off Accelerator by urgency and modality, with 95% confidence intervals 
(*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001)  
 
 
For TTC @ Foot on Brake, there were main effects for Urgency (F(3, 67.6) = 427.09, p < .001) and Modality 
(F(2, 45.8) = 41.73, p < .001), and an interaction between Urgency and Modality (F(6,135.8) = 5.79, p < .001). 
Post-hoc tests (Table 8) show significant differences between all levels of Urgency for all warning types (p < .001), 
although there were only significant differences between warning types (i.e. between w1 and w2) at TTC = 5 
seconds (pmax = .024). Again, differences between having a warning and not having a warning became more 
pronounced as TTC increased (Figure 4). 
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Table 8: Significant post-hoc tests for TTC @ Foot on Brake between warning types 
(W0=None, W1=Audio, W2=Audio+HUD) 
Contrast Urgency Statistics 
w0 - w1 L2 t(173.7) = -3.02, p = 0.008 
w0 - w2 L2 t(173.7) = -2.70, p = 0.021 
w0 - w1 L3 t(175.6) = -4.83, p < 0.001 
w0 - w2 L3 t(175.6) = -4.83, p < 0.001 
w0 - w1 L4 t(173.9) = -6.19, p < 0.001 
w0 - w2 L4 t(176.8) = -8.93, p < 0.001 
w1 - w2 L4 t(178.9) = -2.65, p = 0.024 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: TTC @ Foot on Brake by urgency and modality, with 95% confidence intervals 
(*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001) 
 
 
 
For Headway @ Car Stopped, there were main effects for Urgency (F(3, 45.8) = 117.97, p < .001) and Modality 
(F(2, 44.1) = 15.12, p < .001), and an interaction between Urgency and Modality (F(6,135.8) = 5.79, p = .072) 
(significant at p < .10). Post-hoc tests (Table 9) show significant differences between L1 and {L2, L3,L 4} for all 
warning types, between L2 and {L3, L4} for audio-only, and between L2 and L4 for audio+HUD warnings (all p 
< .001). In addition, significant differences were evident at L3 and L4 between no-warnings and {audio-only, 
audio+HUD} (pmax = .007). There were no significant differences between warning types (w1 and w2) at any levels 
of Urgency. It was also evident, as before, that differences between having a warning and not having a warning 
became more pronounced as TTC increased (Figure 5).  
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Table 9: Significant post-hoc tests for Headway @ Car Stopped  
(W0=None, W1=Audio, W2=Audio+HUD) (#p < 0.1) 
Contrast HMI / Urgency Statistics 
L1-L2 w0 t(181.8) = -7.79, p < 0.001 
L1-L3 w0 t(184.7) = -8.84, p < 0.001 
L1-L4 w0 t(181.2) = -9.19, p < 0.001 
L1-L2 w1 t(170.4) = -8.92, p < 0.001 
L1-L3 w1 t(170.4) = -11.90, p < 0.001 
L1-L4 w1 t(175.3) = -12.95, p < 0.001 
L2-L3 w1 t(170.4) = -2.98, p = 0.017 
L2-L4 w1 t(175.3) = -4.24, p < 0.001 
L1-L2 w2 t(170.4) = -8.43, p < 0.001 
L1-L3 w2 t(170.4) = -10.91, p < 0.001 
L1-L4 w2 t(173.1) = -12.74, p < 0.001 
L2-L3 w2 t(170.4) = -2.48, p = 0.067# 
L2-L4 w2 t(173.1) = -4.40, p < 0.001 
w0 - w1 L3 t(142.1) = -3.76, p = 0.001 
w0 - w2 L3 t(142.1) = -3.06, p = 0.007 
w0 - w1 L4 t(140.6) = -4.84, p < 0.001 
w0 - w2 L4 t(143.3) = -4.79, p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Headway @ Car Stopped by urgency and modality, with 95% confidence intervals of the 
means (*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001) 
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4. Discussion 
The study explored the effect of urgency (defined here by TTC/false alarm rate) and modality (none, audio-
only and audio+HUD) of PCDS alert warnings on driver acceptance and performance associated with an active 
safety system. In practice, most systems will also attempt to perform autonomous emergency braking (or other 
primary control interventions) in critical situations. However, first generation systems are still limited in the range 
of use-cases that can be addressed. Moreover, in the event of a potential collision, all systems will provide a 
warning to advise drivers of the potential hazard, and encourage them to take evasive action, before the system 
assumes control. Understanding drivers’ behaviour in response to such warnings is therefore important. Building 
on previous analyses (reported in: [44, 21]), the study employed a generalized mixed effect model using urgency 
(measured by TTC = {2, 3, 4, 5} seconds, with associated false alarm rates) and modality of warning (HMI = {no, 
Audio, Audio+HUD}) as independent variables. Acceptance is determined based on participants’ responses to 
seven subjective ratings scales, assessing trust, confidence, annoyance, desirability, predictability, reliance and 
risk (based on existing acceptance/usability assessment protocols [41]), which were completed immediately after 
each drive. In addition, objective performance was determined using surrogate measures of safety, i.e. the time-
to-collision (and/or associated headway) at which drivers’ gaze first fixated on the pedestrian at risk, when they 
first lifted their foot from the accelerator (indicating their first response to the warning), when they put their foot 
on the brake pedal (indicating the driver’s first conscious effort to slow the car), and finally, the headway at which 
the driver brought the vehicle to a stop. These measures represent the margin of safety between vehicle and the 
hazard (i.e. vulnerable pedestrian), based on drivers’ responses to the warnings. 
Immediately apparent is that all acceptance items were generally rated highly at all levels of urgency and for 
both HMI solutions – above the median scale-point for positive terms, and below this for negative terms – 
indicating a general acceptance of in-vehicle warnings in situations where a potential threat is present (in this case, 
a pedestrian entering the vehicle’s path). On closer inspection, however, there were notable differences in 
subjective ratings, associated primarily with the time at which warnings were presented (i.e. TTC) (although 
differences were also indicated regarding the confidence that people placed in the different warning modalities, 
discussed later). In particular, later warnings (i.e. at TTC of 2.0 seconds), attracted the lowest ratings of trust, 
confidence, desirability, predictability, reliance and risk (compared to warnings delivered at longer TTCs), even 
though 2.0-second warnings were arguably the most reliable, i.e. suffered from the lowest occurrence of false 
alarms. This suggests that drivers perhaps felt that 2.0-second warnings were issued too late for them to respond 
successfully (i.e. the pedestrian was already compromised). In such situations, drivers would therefore be reliant 
upon primary control interventions for collision mitigation/avoidance that would be expected to follow warnings 
in a real-world PCDS. It also indicates that drivers may be willing to accept the lower perceived reliability (due to 
errors and imperfection in the system, as well as the dynamic behaviour of pedestrians), that will inevitably 
accompany the provision of earlier warnings, even at extended headways (up to 5.0-seconds TTC based on the 
study findings). Of course, this provides additional time for drivers to take corrective action – braking or steering 
away from the hazard. As such, drivers maintain a sense of control, and this may be an important factor 
encouraging the acceptance of in-vehicle technology more generally. Even so, there was a tendency for some 
ratings to reduce at the highest TTCs (in particular, trust and confidence). At this distance, it is possible that drivers 
were unaware of the specific threat posed by the pedestrian – and therefore questioned how accurate the system’s 
assessment could be, or drivers may have felt that they had sufficient time to respond without the assistance of a 
PCDS. 
Participants also indicated increased confidence in all situations where auditory and visual warnings (presented 
on the HUD) were combined, although ratings were comparable for other scale items between audio-only and 
audio+HUD warnings. Providing multi-modal warnings lends itself to redundancy – if the driver fails to see the 
warning on the HUD, they are still likely to hear the audio, and vice versa, and this may account for increased 
confidence in this format. 
As with the subjective data, there were clear differences evident for the objective performance measures based 
on urgency, with drivers fixating their gaze on the ‘target’ pedestrian at longer headway than when earlier warnings 
were provided. In addition, drivers responded further away (i.e. took their foot off the accelerator, and put their 
foot on the brake further from the hazard) when warnings were presented at longer TTC. These actions also 
corresponded with drivers actually bringing their vehicle to a stop further from the pedestrian when warnings were 
provided at longer TTCs – in particular, the headway at which the vehicle stopped was shorter for warnings 
delivered at 2 seconds compared to longer TTCs. Differences between having a warning and not having a warning 
also became more pronounced as TTC increased for all performance measures. This demonstrates the utility and 
value of providing warnings, as they can help drivers to identify the potential hazard, and enact primary controls; 
it also demonstrates an inherent trust in the system, in that drivers appeared willing to accept, and act upon, the 
judgement of the system. 
Results indicate that ‘modality’ made a significant difference for all primary control interventions (foot off 
accelerator, foot on brake, and bringing the car to a stop), with drivers taking these actions sooner when warnings 
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were provided earlier (at TTCs of 4 and 5 seconds). However, these differences were in fact between ‘no warning’ 
and ‘audio and/or HUD’, demonstrating that while the presence of an alert encouraged the driver to respond sooner, 
the modality in which it is presented appeared to make little difference. Interestingly, there were no equivalent 
benefits in localising the target pedestrian in situations when a warning was provided – this is particularly 
noteworthy given that part of the intention of providing conformal warnings was to guide attention towards the 
hazard.  
In situations where a warning was provided, modality (i.e. audio-only or audio+HUD alerts) only influenced 
‘foot-on-brake’ at 5.0-second TTC, with combined audio and HUD warnings encouraging drivers to apply the 
brake further from the hazard. It is therefore particularly interesting to note that drivers claimed greater confidence 
when warnings were also provided on the HUD (in addition to the auditory alarm), given that there were very 
limited performance gains in doing so.  
Although we are confident of the value and contribution of this work, we acknowledge several limitations in 
our approach. Firstly, to define ‘urgency’, we assumed that false alarm rate and TTC are closely related and 
increase together at a linear rate. While there is strong evidence to support this assumption (e.g. [40]), it is 
nevertheless unlikely that this relationship is completely linear. Modelling system performance in this manner may 
therefore be an over-simplification. It also means that it is impossible to differentiate the effects of TTC and false 
alarm rate in our results, although these factors are undeniably linked. In practice, this approach was chosen to 
provide a more ecologically-valid experience of ‘urgency’ – it would be unrealistic to expect perfect human intent 
prediction five seconds into the future. Equally, it would be unusual to experience very high levels of inaccuracy 
at short TTCs where intent modelling is likely to be more robust (particularly with commercially available 
systems). 
In addition, we limited our investigation to false positive alarms, which were in effect due to an imprecision of 
the PCDS – a useful warning was given as a pedestrian hazard did exist, and still had the potential to enter the 
roadway. This arguably mitigates the previous concern to some extent, although we recognise that in practice, 
there are many other factors that are likely to influence the reliability and capability of such systems. For example, 
in a real-world situation, subtle cues, such as head-movements, eye-contact and other postural changes, would 
likely indicate a pedestrian’s intent to enter the roadway, or conversely demonstrate that they were about to stop. 
Such behaviour was notably absent from the simulated environment (due to limitations in the fidelity/functionality 
of the simulation software). Instead, all pedestrians appeared visually similar to drivers, with the exception that 
some continued to walk into the roadway, and others did not, and this may have affected drivers’ behaviour and 
responses. 
Finally, notwithstanding the aforementioned concerns, it is worth bearing in mind that exposing drivers to 
regular and repeated warnings meant that they may have become hyper-vigilant to potential pedestrian threats. 
Although we attempted to address this concern as much as practicable by counterbalancing exposure, there will 
be inevitable influences on drivers’ behaviour caused by the rapid, repeated exposure to potential threats, and thus 
all results should be considered as relative, as indeed they are presented.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Warnings are a common component of pedestrian safety systems, intending to make drivers aware of a potential 
hazard, encouraging them to initiate an evasive manoeuvre, or preparing them for an emergency control 
intervention (such as steering or braking). Thus, understanding the effect of urgency (i.e. when alarms are declared) 
and modality (how they are presented) on driver acceptance and performance is important. In the study, warnings 
were generally well received, inspiring positive ratings of ‘acceptance’ even at extended TTCs, and despite 
relatively high false alarm rates. In addition, earlier warnings helped drivers localise the potential threat sooner, 
and encouraged them to begin evasive braking manoeuvres further from the pedestrian. There was, however, little 
differentiation in drivers’ performance between audio and audio/visual presentations, and modality also appeared 
to have negligible overall effect on generalised ‘acceptance’ ratings. An exception to this was drivers’ confidence, 
which increased with multi-modal presentation, suggesting redundancy in modality improved self-efficacy. In 
addition, delaying warnings (i.e. presenting them at shorter TTCs) detrimented trust, confidence, desirability, 
predictability, reliance and risk, even though later warnings invited fewer false activations. Ultimately, we can 
conclude that providing earlier warnings has the potential to increase the margin of safety between car and 
pedestrian, without necessarily detrimenting acceptance. Moreover, multi-modal warnings are likely to increase 
confidence even though these do not necessarily lead to improvements in drivers’ performance. 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
Acknowledgements 
The research received funding from the European Community’s Eighth Framework Program (Horizon2020) 
(agreement no. 634149: Proactive Safety for Pedestrians and Cyclists (PROSPECT) project), and the NSF-funded 
International Research Experience for Students (IRES) program between Virginia Tech University and the 
University of Nottingham (NSF award: 1261162). 
References 
 
[1]  World Health Organization, “Global status report on road safety,” 2015. 
[2]  K. J. Clifton, C. V. Burnier and G. Akar, “Severity of injury resulting from pedestrian–vehicle crashes: 
What can we learn from examining the built environment?,” Transportation research part D: transport 
and environment, vol. 14, pp. 425-436, 2009.  
[3]  L. F. Beck, A. M. Dellinger and M. E. O'neil, “Motor vehicle crash injury rates by mode of travel, 
United States: using exposure-based methods to quantify differences,” American Journal of 
Epidemiology, vol. 166, pp. 212-218, 2007.  
[4]  F. Graves, D. Lloyd, D. Wilson, D. Mais, W. Deda and A. Bhagat, “Reported Road Casualties Great 
Britain: 2013 Annual Report,” 2014. 
[5]  M. Yanagisawa, E. Swanson and W. G. Najm, “Target Crashes and Safety Benefits Estimation 
Methodology for Pedestrian Crash Avoidance/Mitigation Systems,” 2014. 
[6]  PROSPECT (Proactive Safety for Pedestrians and Cyclists), “Deliverable D2.1: Accident Analysis, 
Naturalistic Observations and Project Implications,” 2016. 
[7]  EUROPEAN NEW CAR ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME (Euro NCAP), “TEST PROTOCOL – 
AEB VRU systems (version 2.0),” 2017. 
[8]  PROSPECT (Proactive Safety for Pedestrians and Cyclists), “Deliverable D5.2: Advanced HMI and 
vehicle control concepts for VRU active safety,” 2017. 
[9]  A. Silla, P. Rama, L. Leden, M. van Noort, J. de Kruijff, D. Bell, A. Morris, G. Hancox and J. 
Scholliers, “Are intelligent transport systems effective in improving the safety of vulnerable road users?,” 
2015.  
[10]  S. Zhang, R. Benenson, M. Omran, J. Hosang and B. Schiele, “How Far are We from Solving 
Pedestrian Detection?,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1602.01237, 2016.  
[11]  R. Parasuraman and V. Riley, “Human and automation: use, misuse, disuse, abuse,” Human Factors, 
vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 230-253, 1997.  
[12]  V. Banks and N. Stanton, “Keep the driver in control: automating automobiles of the future,” Applied 
Ergonomics, vol. 53, no. B, pp. 389-395, 2015.  
[13]  D. Norman, The design of future things, New York: Basic Books, 2007.  
[14]  C. Baldwin and B. Lewis, “Perceived urgency mapping across modalities within a driving context,” 
Applied Ergonomics, vol. 45, pp. 1270-1277, 2014.  
[15]  E. Adell, Driver experience and acceptance of driver support systems: a case of speed adaptation, 
2009.  
[16]  M. Ghazizadeh, J. Lee and L. Boyle, “Extending the Technology Acceptance Model to assess 
automation,” Cognition, Technology & Work, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 39-49, 2012.  
[17]  J. Schade and M. Baum, “Reactance or acceptance? Reactions towards the introduction of road 
pricing,” Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 41-48, 2007.  
[18]  K. Ausserer and R. Risser, “Intelligent transport systems and services-chances and risks,” in ICTCT-
workshop, 2005.  
[19]  T. Sheridan, “Risk, human error, and system resilience: fundamental ideas,” Human Factors: The 
Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 418-426, 2008.  
17 
 
[20]  J. Källhammer and K. Smith, “Assessing contextual factors that influence acceptance of pedestrian 
alerts by a night vision system,” Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics 
Society, vol. 54, no. 4, pp. 654-662, 2012.  
[21]  C. Merenda, H. Kim, S. Leong, J. Gabbard, G. Burnett and D. Large, “Did you see me? Assessing 
Real vs. Perceived Driving Gains across Multi-modality Pedestrian Alert Systems,” in The 9th 
International ACM Conference on Automotive User Interfaces and Interactive Vehicular Applications 
(AutoUI2017), Oldenburg, Germany, 2017.  
[22]  J. De Boer, A. Chaziris, J. Vreeswijk, J. Bie and B. Van Arem, “The accuracy and timing of pedestrian 
warnings at intersections: The acceptance from drivers and their preferences,” in 13th International IEEE 
Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC),, 2010.  
[23]  J. Lee, D. McGehee, T. Brown and M. Reyes, “Collision warning timing, driver distraction, and driver 
response to imminent rear-end collisions in a high-fidelity driving simulator,” Human Factors: The 
Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 314-334, 2002.  
[24]  J. Lee and B. Kantowitz, “Perceptual and cognitive aspects of intelligent transportation systems,” 
Human factors in intelligent transportation systems, 1998.  
[25]  J. D. Lee and K. A. See, “Trust in automation: designing for appropriate reliance,” Human Factors, 
vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 50-80, 2004.  
[26]  L. Bainbridge, “Ironies of automation,” Automatica, vol. 19, no. 6, pp. 775-779, 1983.  
[27]  A. Löcken, A. Unni, H. Müller and S. Boll, “The car that cares: introducing an in-vehicle ambient 
display to reduce cognitive load,” in Automotive User Interfaces and Interactive Vehicular Applications, 
Eindhoven, The Netherlands, 2013.  
[28]  A. Meschtscherjakov, C. Döttlinger, C. Rödel and M. Tscheligi, “ChaseLight: ambient LED strips to 
control driving speed,” in Automotive User Interfaces and Interactive Vehicular Applications, 
Nottingham, UK, 2015.  
[29]  G. Burnett, “A road-based evaluation of a head-up display for presenting navigation information,” in 
Proceedings of the HCI international conference, Crete, 2003.  
[30]  D. Foyle, B. Hooey, J. Wilson and W. Johnson, “HUD symbology for surface operations: command 
guidance vs. situation guidance formats,” SAE Transactions: Journal of Aerospace, vol. 111, pp. 647-658, 
2002.  
[31]  Y.-C. Liu and M.-H. Wen, “Comparison of head-up display (HUD) vs. head-down display (HDD): 
driving performance of commercial vehicle operators in Taiwan,” International Journal of Human-
Computer Studies, vol. 61, no. 5, pp. 679-697, 2004.  
[32]  H. Kim, A. Miranda Anon, T. Misu, N. Li, A. Tawari and K. Fujimura, “Look at Me: Augmented 
Reality Pedestrian Warning System Using an In-Vehicle Volumetric Head Up Display,” in Proceedings 
of the 21st International Conference on Intelligent User Interfaces, 2016.  
[33]  R. Eyraud, E. Zibetti and T. Baccino, “Allocation of visual attention while driving with simulated 
augmented reality,” Transportation research part F: traffic psychology and behaviour, vol. 32, pp. 46-55, 
2015.  
[34]  P. Rane, H. Kim, J. Marcano and J. Gabbard, “Virtual road signs: Augmented reality driving aid for 
novice drivers,” in Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, Los 
Angeles, 2016.  
[35]  H. Kim, J. Isleib and J. Gabbard, “Virtual Shadow: Making Cross Traffic Dynamics Visible through 
Augmented Reality Head Up Display,” in Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 
Annual Meeting, Los Angeles, 2016.  
[36]  T. Sayer, J. Sayer and J. Devonshire, “Assessment of a driver interface for lateral drift and curve speed 
warning systems: mixed results for auditory and haptic warnings,” in Proceedings of Driving Assessment, 
2005.  
18 
 
[37]  M. Blanco, J. Atwood, H. Vasquez, T. Trimble, V. Fitchett, V. Radlbeck, G. Fitch, S. Russell, C. 
Green, B. Cullinane and J. Morgan, Human factors evaluation of level 2 and level 3 automated driving 
concepts, Washington, DC, 2015.  
[38]  C. Ho and C. Spence, The multisensory driver: implications for ergonomic car interface design, 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008.  
[39]  R. Gray, C. Spence, C. Ho and H. Tan, “Efficient multimodal cuing of spatial attention,” Proceedings 
of the IEEE, vol. 10, pp. 2113-2122, 2013.  
[40]  C. Keller and D. Gavrila, “Will the pedestrian cross? a study on pedestrian path prediction,” IEEE 
Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 494-506, 2014.  
[41]  J. Brooke, “ SUS-A quick and dirty usability scale,” Usability evaluation in industry, vol. 189, no. 
194, pp. 4-7, 1996.  
[42]  J. L. Campbell, C. M. Richard, J. L. Brown and M. McCallum, “Crash warning system interfaces: 
human factors insights and lessons learned,” US Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration, 2007. 
[43]  N. Reader, “Development and validation of functional definitions and evaluation procedures for 
collision warning/avoidance systems,” 1999. 
[44]  D. R. Large, C. Harvey, G. Burnett, C. Merenda, S. Leong and Gabbard, “Exploring the Relationship 
Between False Alarms and Driver Acceptance of a Pedestrian Alert System During Simulated Driving,” 
in Road Safety and Simulation International Conference, The Hague, Netherlands, 2017.  
 
 
 
 
 
